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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
American Wild Horse Campaign v. Bernhardt, 963 F.3d 1001 (9th
Cir. 2020)
Synopsis
The plaintiff, a wild horse advocacy group, brought an action against the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), protesting their decision to use various
methods to prevent wild horses from breeding. The plaintiff asserted that BLM’s
decision violated a number of environmental acts. The district court granted
BLM summary judgment, after which the advocacy group appealed. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, addressing each act alleged to be
violated in turn.
Facts and Analysis
Congress tasked the defendants with preserving the thousands of wild
horses that live in the American West, while also taking into account the “needs
of other wildlife and livestock that depend on the resources of public lands.” 1 In
2017, BLM determined that an overpopulation of wild horses in Nevada
necessitated action, and it planned to “adjust the sex ratio of the population,
administer fertility control treatment to mares, and geld and release back to the
range some male horses.”2 This plan was called the Antelope and Triple B
Complexes Gather Plan (“Gather Plan”), named for the areas of land that
contained an excess population of wild horses.3 The purpose of the gelding
component was to allow more horses to remain free-roaming, rather than to slow
population growth.4 The plaintiffs objected specifically to the “geld and release”
portion of the plan and claimed that BLM was in violation of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Administrative Procedure Act, and the
Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (WHBA).5
BLM obtained a report from the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS
Report”) that would assist BLM in creating a plan that would address anticipated
challenges.6 The NAS Report noted that BLM must consider “changes in
expression of sexual and social behavior” in horses when crafting its plan and
emphasized pros and cons of potential sterilization methods.7 As the NAS Report
was inconclusive in terms of the effects of gelding on herds of wild horses, BLM

1

American Wild Horse Campaign v. Bernhardt, 963 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id.
3
Id. at 1006.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 1004. The court discussed the statutory history of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and
Burros Act at length. Id. at 1004–05. The amended version of the Act allows BLM to “remove
excess horses when it faces overpopulation” and “the authority to use other population control
methods . . . to avoid overpopulation.” Id. at 1005. Although BLM must consult with state
wildlife agencies, it retains broad discretion in removing the excess animals. Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 1005–06.
2
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conducted a study performing tests as to geldings’ effectiveness and its impact on
the behavior of free-roaming wild horses.8
BLM received almost 5,000 public comments on a 2017 preliminary
environmental assessment of the Gather Plan that stated experts’ concerns of the
effects of gelding on the behavior of wild horses once the geldings were returned
to the herd.9 BLM responded by concluding that the experts’ opinions were
speculative as “none of them had conducted a study on the topic,” and that BLM
was not required to create an environmental impact statement (“EIS”), as the
Gather Plan would “not significantly affect the human environment.” 10 The
plaintiffs brought suit challenging BLM’s “geld and release” plan, claiming that
BLM acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 11
When considering the potential NEPA violations, the court noted that an
EIS is needed when the federal action “‘significantly affect[s] the quality of the
human environment.’”12 To make this determination, an agency must consider
context and intensity (severity of the impact) of the effects of the action. 13 The
plaintiffs asserted that five out of ten intensity factors demonstrated that the
Gather Plan may have had a significant impact and thus warranted an EIS. 14 The
court examined each contested factor in turn.
The first factor required an agency to prepare an EIS when the possible
effects of its actions are “highly uncertain” and raise “substantial questions” about
the action’s environmental impact. 15 The court found that BLM’s plan did not
meet this threshold, as they used the research that existed at the time to predict
that effects of their plan would likely be insignificant.16 Drawing from precedents
in prior cases, the court acknowledged that the fact that the “[Fish and Wildlife
Service] did not have perfect information and had to extrapolate did not make the
possible effects ‘highly uncertain’ and did not require the preparation of an
EIS.”17 BLM did not have to find that its plan would have no effect on the
environment, but rather that there were “not substantial questions as to whether
gelding and release would have a significant effect on the environment.”18
Although some of the long-term effects of the plan were unknown, BLM
nevertheless drew reasonable conclusions about geldings’ behavior and family
structures within the herds post-release and provided proper scientific foundation

8
Id. at 1006. Data from this study was not yet available at the time of the opinion, but will be
analyzed in October 2020 at the earliest. Id.
9
Id. at 1006–07.
10
Id. at 1007.
11
Id.
12
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)).
13
Id. 1008 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27).
14
Id.
15
Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5)).
16
Id.
17
Id. (citing Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701, 712 (9th Cir.
2009)). See also EPIC v. United States Forest Service, 451 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2006); Native
Ecosystems Council v. United States Forest Service, 428 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2005).
18
American Wild Horse Campaign at 1009.
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for those conclusions.19 On this factor, the court found that BLM’s decision to
not require an EIS was not arbitrary or capricious.20
The court also concluded that the effects of the Gather Plan were not
“highly controversial” with regard to the second factor in question. 21 Again, the
plaintiffs did not provide any evidence that cast doubt on BLM’s conclusions, as
the NAS Report was inconclusive and the plaintiffs’ experts provided only
speculation, rather than citing existing research. 22 “Opposition to an action does
not, by itself, create a controversy within the meaning of NEPA regulations” and,
because BLM “considered and addressed existing literature in its environmental
assessment and provided reasoning for its conclusions,” the court found the
NEPA requirements satisfied as to this factor. 23
When examining the third factor regarding BLM’s determination that the
gather area was not in proximity to “historic or cultural resources,”24 the court
noted that wild horses cannot be considered a cultural resource under NEPA. 25
This is the case because the management of wild horses and evaluation of the
effects of agency actions on wild horses are governed by the WHBA, which states
that horses should be managed as “components of the public lands.” 26 “A specific
statute, such as the WHBA’s directive as to how to manage wild horses, governs
over a general provision, such as NEPA.”27 Therefore, the court discounted the
plaintiffs’ issue with this factor.
The plaintiffs also attested that the Gather Plan established precedent for
“future actions with significant effects” 28 (the fourth factor), but the court
disagreed, finding that BLM’s plan did not “establish gelding as an accepted
population-management tool” and that the plan was highly specific to the location
and the project itself.29 Finally, there was no threat of a violation of federal law
(the fifth factor) because BLM was acting in accordance with the WHBA.30 After
examining all five factors, the court concluded that BLM’s determination that an
EIS was not required was permissible because all intensity factors were properly
considered.31
In their second claim, the “plaintiffs also argue[d] that BLM acted
arbitrarily and capriciously because it did not address the Gelding Study, did not
consider the expert opinions that the plaintiffs highlighted in their public
comments, and did not adequately consider the NAS Report.” 32 The court again
addressed each of the plaintiffs’ arguments in turn.
19

Id.
Id. at 1011.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(3)).
25
Id. at 1011.
26
Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a)).
27
Id. (citing Perez-Martin v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 2005)).
28
Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. 1508.27(b)(6)).
29
Id. at 1011–12.
30
Id. at 1012.
31
Id.
32
Id.
20
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Although the court noted that BLM did not address its Gelding Study at
length in its environmental assessment, nor wait to authorize the plan until the
data from the Study was collected, BLM did consider relevant factors raised by
the study and “explained why additional information was not available.” 33 The
Gelding Study had not yet provided data on the effects of releasing gelded horses,
so it was reasonable for BLM to not address this issue.34 However, after receiving
complaints about the lack of research, BLM included a description of the study in
its final environmental assessment, along with a note that the findings would not
be ready for several years.35 This was sufficient to comply with NEPA’s “hard
look” standard.36
Furthermore, the plaintiffs also argued that the Gather Plan violated the
Administrative Procedure Act through BLM acting arbitrarily and capriciously in
including gelding and release in the plan “without explaining why BLM no longer
deemed the Study’s results necessary for informed-decision making.”37 However,
the court concluded that BLM did not find the Study unnecessary – rather,
components of the Gather Plan itself were meant to improve BLM’s knowledge of
the effects of gelding and release. 38 Furthermore, the WHBA does not obligate
BLM to address all expert opinions submitted during the period for public
comment.39 The court found that BLM’s action was not arbitrary or capricious in
this respect because it gave reasons for not relying on those experts and pointed
them toward sections of the environmental assessment that addressed the experts’
concerns.40 Finally, BLM complied with the WHBA in that it consulted the
National Academy of Sciences to determine how “appropriate management levels
should be achieved.”41 Although BLM did not address vasectomy expressly, the
court noted that the NAS Report was ambivalent on the issue and BLM’s
guidebook expresses similar uncertainty. 42 Because the BLM’s reasoning for
rejecting vasectomies were clear, the failure to respond to comments about the
issue was not arbitrary or capricious.43
Holding
The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, finding that BLM did not
act arbitrarily and capriciously. 44 The court emphasized that specific acts, such as
the WHBA, supersede general provisions such as NEPA.45 Because all intensity
factors as to whether the Gather Plan would have a significant impact on the
33

Id.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. (citing In Defense of Animals v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 751 F.3d 1054, 1072–
73 (9th Cir. 2014)).
37
Id. at 1012.
38
Id. at 1012–13.
39
Id. at 1013 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1)).
40
Id.
41
Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1)).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1013–14.
44
Id. at 1004.
45
Id.
34
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environment were properly considered, BLM’s decision not to prepare an EIS was
permissible.46 Furthermore, because BLM’s reasoning was clear in its
environmental assessment, there was no arbitrary and capricious action in its
failure to respond to all expert complaints or address all alternative methods of
accomplishing its goal.47
Impact
A broadly applicable concept from this case to administrative law as a
whole is the court’s ruling that specific acts will always supersede general
provisions, such as the WHBA’s domination over general NEPA provisions.
Additionally, the court clarifies aspects of NEPA in this case, as well as
establishes the standards for arbitrary and capricious agency action in terms of
responding to public comments, relying on experts, and addressing all available
research. Finally, the court clarifies that wild horses do not fall under the
“cultural resource” aspect of NEPA; rather, their care and protection falls under
the WHBA.

46
47

Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1014.
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Doe v. University of St. Thomas, 972 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2020)
Synopsis
A male student brought a negligence claim against the defendant (a private
university) regarding an investigation of a sexual misconduct claim by a female
student. The investigation resulted in the male student’s suspension from the
university. Following an appeal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to the university, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a private
university’s common-law duty to prevent arbitrary expulsions of students covers
expulsion as a result of non-academic related misconduct. However, upon
examination of the facts of this case, the court of appeals found that the
university’s disciplinary process was not arbitrary and affirmed the ruling of the
lower court.
Facts and Analysis
The plaintiff John Doe, a student at the University of St. Thomas, was
suspended from the university after a female student accused him of sexual
misconduct.48 In response, Doe filed suit against the university asserting state law
claims and Title IX violations.49 After hearing the case, the district court granted
summary judgment to the university, “finding that Doe had not shown a genuine
issue of fact that the disciplinary proceedings were biased against him or that any
alleged procedural flaws breached the University’s duty of reasonable care.”50
The court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo.51
On appeal, Doe argued that the university breached its duty of care
because its “disciplinary process unfairly favored accusers and did not afford the
necessary procedural due process protections.”52 The court first stated that it must
determine what duty of care a private university owes its students.53 Although the
parties agreed that Minnesota common law governed the determination, they
disagreed over “whether the duty of care requires private universities
investigating non-academic misconduct violations to act reasonably and in a
manner that comports with constitutional due process or just refrain from acting
arbitrarily.”54
The court noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court had not decided this
issue (which would govern their decision), but cited a recent case, Abbariao v.
Hamline University School of Law, which addressed the “common law duty
universities owe their students.”55 The case involved a law student who claimed
that an expulsion for failure to maintain required grades was a violation of his

48

Doe v. University of St. Thomas, 972 F.3d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 2020).
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1016–17.
55
Id. at 1017.
49
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procedural due process rights and a common law duty of fair treatment. 56 There,
the Minnesota Supreme Court found that “an academic expulsion from a state
actor violate[d] due process if it ‘results from the arbitrary, capricious, or badfaith actions of university officials.’”57 However, the court provided that
“‘judicial examination into issues of academic performance may well be different
from cases involving expulsion for alleged misconduct not directly related to
academic proficiency.’”58 As private universities are not subject to federal due
process requirements, the court noted that under Minnesota common law, “‘a
university may not arbitrarily expel a student,’” relying on another case to reach
this conclusion.59 After Abariao, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that even
in non-academic misconduct discipline, the arbitrary manner standard was the
proper measure to use.60
When looking at the case at hand, the court observed that the district court
rejected precedent in Abariao and Rollins, instead using the reasonable care
standard proposed by Doe, which stated that the university was obligated to
utilize a process that was fair and impartial to all parties involved in the
proceeding, and to provide some measure of due process to ensure accuracy in the
eventual outcome.61 The court found that the lower court erred in rejecting this
precedential standard, noting that there was no reason to disregard Rollins, as it
applied the common law duty to a non-academic expulsion by a private
university.62 The district court instead incorrectly applied the arbitrary standard
used in Gleason, which involved a student with both academic and misconduct
charges.63
However, the court ultimately found that “[e]ven under the district court’s
more permissive reasonable care standard, Doe’s claims did not survive summary
judgment.”64 Applying the correct standard of Abbariao, the court reached the
same conclusion.65 Doe brought evidence alleging that the university’s training
materials caused officials to be biased against accused students, providing
samples of materials and statistics made available to university staff. 66 The
district court found that “Doe had not overcome the presumption of honesty and

56

Id. (referencing Abbariao v. Hamline University School of Law, 258 N.W.2d 108, 111
(Minn. 1977)).
57
Id. (citing Abbariao at 112).
58
Id. (citing Abbariao at 113).
59
Id. (citing Abbariao at 112). The Abbariao court relied on Gleason v. University of
Minnesota, a case where the student in question had been charged with both academic deficiencies
and “certain insubordinate acts toward the faculty of the University of Minnesota and with inciting
younger students to insubordinate acts towards said faculty.” See Gleason, 104 Minn. 359, 363
(1908).
60
Doe at 1017 (referencing Rollins v. Cardinal Stritch University, 626 N.W.2d 464, 470
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001)).
61
Id. at 1018.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 1018–19.
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integrity afforded to school administrators.”67 This presumption cannot be
overcome unless “actual bias, such as personal animosity, illegal prejudice, or a
personal or financial stake in the outcome can be proven.”68 Because Doe
presented no evidence to show individual bias against him, the district court
granted summary judgment.69
On review, the Eighth Circuit agreed that there was no genuine dispute of
material fact in the case. 70 Although the court was “troubled” by the use of
stereotypes in the university’s training, it noted there was no evidence presented
that the materials influenced university officials’ judgment and that no reasonable
jury would find bias in the investigation. 71 Because there was no evidence of
individualized bias or “that University’s proceedings were the product of will,
instead of judgment,” the court affirmed the granting of summary judgment.72
Holding
The court affirmed the lower court’s decision after a de novo review of its
interpretation of state law. 73 After a thorough review of Minnesota case law, the
court held that although the district court utilized the wrong standard in granting
summary judgment, the correct standard leads to the same result. 74 Because Doe
was unable to show any evidence of individualized bias against him or any
prejudice in the university’s proceedings regarding him, the court affirmed the
lower court’s granting of summary judgment.75
Impact
This case establishes the bar for the extension of common law duties to
private universities in matters related to non-academic expulsion in the Eighth
Circuit. Defining “arbitrary” in cases such as these, however, will still require
further time, as the court noted. Evidence of individualized bias or prejudice in
expulsion proceedings will be required to bring a successful case of this type in
the Eighth Circuit in the future.

67

Id. at 1019.
Id. (citing Richmond v. Fowlkes, 228 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2000)).
69
Id. at 1019.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 1019.
73
Id. at 1016.
74
Id. at 1018–19.
75
Id. at 1018.
68
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DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. Small Business Administration,
960 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2020)
Synopsis
The Small Business Administration (SBA) enacted a rule excluding
sexually oriented businesses from Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan
guarantees under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(CARES Act). A number of sexually oriented businesses brought an action
claiming that the SBA exceeded its statutory authority in adopting this rule.
Following the district court’s grant of the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
judgment, the SBA moved for a stay pending an appeal. The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the SBA should not be allowed a stay.
Facts and Analysis
At issue was the interpretation of congressional legislation meant to
address economic hardship caused by COVID-19.76 Congress enacted the PPP,
which allowed the SBA to “guarantee up to $349 billion in PPP loans,” and
increased the guaranteed amount to $649 billion in April of 2020.77 The text of
the legislation states that:
in addition to small business concerns, any business concern,
nonprofit organization, veterans organization, or Tribal business
concern described in section 657a(b)(2)(C) of this title shall be
eligible to receive a covered loan if the business concern, nonprofit
organization, veterans organization, or Tribal business concern
employs not more than the greater of-- (I) 500 employees; or (II) if
applicable, the size standard in number of employees established
by the Administration for the industry in which the business
concern, nonprofit organization, veterans organization, or Tribal
business concern operates.78
The SBA enacted a “PPP Ineligibility Rule,” which “renders sexually
oriented businesses and certain other businesses ineligible to receive PPP loan
guarantees.”79 The plaintiffs (owners of various sexually oriented businesses)
contended that their businesses were lawful and operated within the constraints of
licenses and permits, but that the SBA denied their applications for loans based on
the PPP Ineligibility Rule.80 The district court found that the SBA “exceeded its
statutory authority when it adopted this rule and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for

76

DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. Small Bus. Admin., 960 F.3d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 2020).
Id.
78
Id. (citing 15 USC § 636(a)(36)(D)(i) (emphasis added)).
79
Id.
80
Id.
77
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preliminary injunctive relief.”81 The SBA responded by moving “to stay the
preliminary injunction pending a decision on the merits of the appeal.” 82
The court utilizes a four factor test to determine whether a stay should be
granted: “(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the
merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be irreparably
harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be harmed if the court
grants the stay; and (4) the public interest in granting the stay.”83
When considering the first factor, the standard of review is highly
deferential to the district court and the review is only to determine whether there
was an abuse of discretion. 84 The court then turned to the framework for
determine the validity of an agency’s interpretation of a statute: “[f]irst, always, is
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”85 The district court applied this framework and found that the CARES
Act, as written by Congress, prevented the SBA from refusing aid to sexually
oriented businesses.86 Citing the term “any business concern” and noting that
‘any’ “carries an expansive meaning,” the district court found that provided a
business met the size criteria, it should be eligible for aid.87 This interpretation
implies that Congress specifically made the SBA’s ineligibility rules
inapplicable.88
The SBA responded that the CARES Act included a specification for
“nonprofit organizations” as eligible for PPP loans, despite their normal
ineligibility for SBA loans normally. 89 Therefore, if Congress had intended for
sexually oriented businesses to be eligible, it could have included similar
clarifying language.90 The court disagreed, however, stating that the broad term
“any business concern” encompassed sexually oriented businesses, but not nonprofits (as they are not businesses), so specialized language was required for their
inclusion.91
The court then analyzed the remaining factors as a group, stating that “the
harm to the SBA in the absence of a stay is far outweighed by the harm to the
plaintiffs if a stay is granted.”92 Without the aid from the PPP (which would
likely be unavailable by the conclusion of the appeal), the plaintiffs would likely
81

Id.
Id.
83
Id. at 746 (quoting Mich. Coal of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d
150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991)).
84
Id. (citing Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d
535, 541 (6th Cir. 2000)).
85
Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 747.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
82
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lose their businesses, which would be contrary to the PPP’s stated purpose of
“protect[ing] the employment and livelihood of employees.” 93 The public interest
would also be served in “guaranteeing that any business, including [the]
plaintiffs’, receive loans to protect and support their employees during the
pandemic.”94 As the SBA guarantees loans on a first-come, first-served basis,
other businesses may not receive loans whether or not the plaintiffs’ businesses
are permitted to do so.95
The dissent held that Congress’s language in the CARES Act remained
ambiguous regarding whether “any business concern” was meant to modify the
preceding language of the Act or whether, as the court found, it should be
interpreted to mean that any business was eligible for a PPP loan with no regard
to prior SBA restrictions.96 Congress noted that PPP loans are meant to be
distributed “under the same terms, conditions, and processes” as 7(a) loans, which
would normally exclude sexually oriented businesses from eligibility. 97 Because
of CARES Act’s ambiguity, the dissent found that the plaintiffs had not
demonstrated a “strong likelihood of success on the merits” required for the court
to deny the stay until a more “careful analysis of the law” could be conducted. 98
Holding
Applying the Chevron framework, the Court upheld the district court’s
preliminary injunction. It held that sexually oriented businesses were meant to be
included under the CARES Act framework because of the broad language
Congress chose to use, and could not be excluded from PPP loans by the SBA.99
Additionally, public policy would better be served by allowing the plaintiffs’
businesses to receive loans, as more businesses and employees would be protected
during the COVID-19 pandemic.100 Based on a balancing of the relevant factors,
the court denied the SBA’s motion for a stay. 101
Impact
In the difficult times the world now faces with the COVID-19 pandemic,
determining who receives what type of aid is not an easy task, and the courts
likely will have to interpret Congress’s language and intent to make difficult
decisions. This order is a prime example. However, as the dissent points out, if
the language is ambiguous and can be subject to different meanings among the
judges, the courts have a difficult task ahead of them.

93

Id.
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 747 (Siler, J., dissenting).
97
Id. at 748. (Siler, J., dissenting, citing 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(B)).
98
Id. (Siler, J., dissenting).
99
Id. at 746.
100
Id. at 747.
101
Id.
94
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Greenbrier Hospital, LLC v. Azar, 974 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2020)
Synopsis
The plaintiff healthcare provider brought action against the defendant, the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to obtain
judicial review of the defendant’s interpretation of the Medicare reimbursement
scheme as it relates to inpatient psychiatric facilities (IPFs). The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, and the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the interpretation of the reimbursement scheme put forth by
the Secretary was reasonable.
Facts and Analysis
The conflict in this case surrounded provisions governing the
“compensation formula for the payment of certain health care providers—a
formula that changes once a year.”102 However, on January 1, it was unclear
which formula (the previous year’s or the new year’s) applied for payments made
on that day.103
HHS issued a rule at the direction of Congress in 2004 that set forth the
new reimbursement scheme for inpatient psychiatric facilities (IPFs).104 The rule
contained a transition schedule from the previous reimbursement system to a new
system over a three-year period.105 During this transition, IPFs would get a
“blended payment”—a combination of the old reimbursement scheme and the
new one, the combination of which would vary year by year, with the new
formula taking effect on July 1. 106 However, in 2005, HHS put forth a correction
that allowed the new formula to take effect on January 1, as opposed to July 1.107
However, the language of the corrected regulation left an ambiguity about which
scheme (the old year’s or the new year’s) applied on January 1.108 This was a
problem because, as the court noted, “[f]or example, a cost reporting period
beginning on January 1, 2006, appears to be eligible for both the 25% per diem
rate and the 50% per diem rate—an obvious problem because presumably an IPF
can be reimbursed under only one formula per year.”109
The plaintiff IPF, Greenbrier Hospital, asserted that this ambiguity
allowed it to choose which formula it wished to apply, and applied for
reimbursement under the preceding year’s formula. 110 The Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS) rejected the plaintiff’s claim, paid it under the new
formula and reversed a Provider Reimbursement Review Board determination to
the contrary.111 The plaintiff then sought judicial review and the district court
102
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granted summary judgment to the government, finding that the Administrator’s
interpretation of the conflicting provisions was reasonable. 112
In the beginning of the opinion, the court described the protocol for
analysis when provisions of the same law appear to conflict. The process began
by “attempt[ing] to reconcile the competing provisions in a manner that gives
effect to each one.”113 If provisions cannot be reconciled, the court noted that
they must save as much of the statute as they can and determine “which of the two
conflicting provisions should govern in a particular case.”114 Finally, if the court
cannot determine which provision should control, the court should deny both
provisions of the law and move forward, although this is a last resort.115
When applying this analysis to the provisions at issue in this case, the
court chose “to minimize damage to text by giving effect to the provision most
obviously dictated by the context of the rule.”116 The court accomplished this by
examining the text of the previous rule and noting that the previous timespan was
July 1 to June 30, which caused no conflict. 117 Therefore, the court concluded
that by following the spirit of the previous rule, the new formula should be given
effect on January 1.118
When examining this case, the court noted that “reconcil[ing] potentially
conflicting provisions by attempting to read the text in harmony” would be
impossible here because of the incongruity of the text.119 The court instead chose
to look to context to do the least damage to the text and found that the 2005 rule
should be construed “to give effect to the new formula, and not the formula from
the preceding year, when presented with a cost report that begins on January
1.”120 HHS made clear in its argument before the court that the correction in
question was not a change in policy; rather, it was meant to “conform the
regulation text to the actual policy.”121 The court found unpersuasive the
plaintiff’s argument that it should choose the formula that applies on January 1
because there was no substantive change in policy, and allowing the plaintiff IPF
to choose would contradict that notion. 122 Furthermore, nowhere in the text of the
rule itself does it allow an IPF to choose the formula itself, and the plaintiff was
unable to support this position substantively. 123
The court noted its decision cannot resolve the conflict in the legislation in
its entirety, so it simply affirmed the lower court’s decision to “limit the damage
to text by applying the new incoming rule on January 1, rather than the old rule
from the preceding year.”124
112
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Holding
The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, agreeing with the agency’s
proposal for how the compensation scheme should be interpreted. 125 After the
proper analysis involving two provisions of the same law that appear to conflict,
the court examined previous legislation in the same area to find context for the
rule, and used this context to reach a conclusion.126 The new provisions should be
interpreted in the same way that the previous provisions operated: the new system
for compensation should take effect on January 1 of the new year, as opposed to
the previous year’s system. 127
Impact
This ruling demonstrates the attitude courts have toward interpreting
legislation that is internally inconsistent. Here, the court wielded its authority to
interpret the rule for specific situations such as the one before it, but ideally to do
the least damage to the text possible, to preserve the legislature’s role in the
branch system. Whether other courts will follow the Fifth Circuit’s lead remains
to be seen, but this case undoubtedly sets a standard for the judicial attitude
toward interpreting conflicting legislation.
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Level the Playing Field v. Federal Election Commission, 961 F.3d
462
(D.C. Cir. 2020)
Synopsis
Level the Playing Field, a non-profit corporation created to enhance
public awareness of independent candidates for elected office, challenged the
Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) dismissal of their complaint under the
Administrative Procedure Act. The corporation’s complaint challenged the
Commission on Presidential Debates’ (CPD) use of polling criteria to determine
whether a candidate should participate in presidential debates. The complaint also
sought equitable relief that the FEC adjust its rules to forbid debate sponsors from
using public opinion polls to determine a candidate’s eligibility to participate.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the FEC did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in making two determinations about the CPD’s conduct:
that the CPD was not overtly partisan, and that the requirement that a candidate
obtain support from at minimum 15% of the national electorate satisfies the
requirement for objective criteria.
Facts and Analysis
The plaintiffs—Level the Playing Field, and one registered voter from the
District of Columbia, the Green Party, and the Libertarian National Committee
each—brough suit against the FEC (the defendant), asserting that the CPD lends
support to Republican and Democratic nominees for public office to the detriment
of those nominees from third-parties and that the “CPD uses subjective and biased
criteria for selecting debate participants.” 128 The government does not fund the
CPD; instead, it “is governed by an independent Board of Directors.” 129 The CPD
imposes three requirements on potential participants in debates it sponsors: that
the candidate be qualified for President under the Constitution, that the candidate
be “on the ballot of enough states to have a mathematical chance of winning a
majority vote in the Electoral College,” and that the candidate have “a level of
support of at least 15% of the national electorate,” a criterion which is determined
by an average of the recent results of five public opinion polling organizations. 130
The plaintiffs’ administrative complaints challenged the final requirement, and
petitioned the FEC to change its rules to “prohibit debate sponsors from using
public opinion polls as a criterion for eligibility.”131 The FEC dismissed both
complaints.132
The plaintiffs brought the case to the district court, alleging a violation of
the Administrative Procedure Act. 133 The district court remanded both matters to

Level the Playing Field v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 961 F.3d 462, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
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the FEC, who returned the same result. 134 The district court then granted
summary judgment in favor of the FEC, and the plaintiffs appealed, bringing the
case before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.135
The court began its opinion by noting its deference in judicial review to
decisions of the FEC.136 Although the plaintiffs requested a less deferential
standard of review, alleging that the decisions in question display a “partisan
agenda,” the court noted that decisions involving bias of this manner are those to
which the existing arbitrary-and-capricious standard would apply. 137
Accordingly, the court did not create a new standard of review to utilize in this
case.138
The court then moved to the plaintiffs’ assertion that the FEC ignored the
CPD’s blatant bias against independent candidates. 139 The court agreed with the
FEC that early statements made about the CPD around the time of its founding do
not describe the CPD in its current form, and supported the need for context
surrounding these statements.140 Additionally, the court concurred with the FEC
in that individuals’ statements could not be “indicative of CPD’s organizational
endorsement of or support for the Democratic and Republican Parties and their
candidates.”141 More contemporaneous statements made by leading officials fell
under the same argument. 142 The court of appeals agreed with the district court
that a disagreement over whether partisan activities reflect the views of an
employee’s organization did not relieve the plaintiffs of their burden to prove that
the FEC acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.143
The plaintiffs also presented two expert reports to the district court to
suggest that the “15% polling requirement to select debate candidates is
‘subjective’ and favors major-party candidates.”144 The FEC, in examining these
reports, found them unpersuasive, and the court in turn found the FEC’s critiques
of the two reports reasonable. 145 More broadly, however, the court stated that
simply because a threshold is difficult to reach for a third party candidate, it does
not become an inherently subjective criterion for determining a candidate’s
eligibility to participate in debates. 146
The court once again expressed deference to the FEC when considering
the plaintiffs’ final request, for the FEC to initiate a rulemaking to prohibit debate
sponsors from using polling thresholds to determine a candidate’s eligibility for
debates. Because “[f]ederal agencies have ‘broad discretion to choose how to
best marshal [their] limited resources and personnel to carry out [their] delegated
134
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responsibilities,’” the court affirmed the FEC’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’
complaints.147
Holding
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the plaintiffs
did not meet their burden in showing that the FEC’s decision in dismissing their
complaints was arbitrary or unreasonable. 148 On the contrary, the FEC
“thoughtfully evaluated the record” and “offered detailed explanations in support
of its view that the plaintiffs failed to show impermissible bias against
independent candidates or in favor of candidates from the two major political
parties.”149 Noting the increased difficulty for independent candidates to meet the
15% requirement, the court did not find this measure subjective and ruled for the
FEC.150 Finally, because the court “found that the [FEC] acted reasonably in
reaching those decisions, [it held] that the [FEC] did not err by electing not to
initiate a rulemaking.”151
Impact
The court’s deference to decisions made by the FEC is particularly
relevant as 2020 is an election year. The court has noted that it will hold the
plaintiffs to the established arbitrary and capricious standard 152 and that a finding
of reasonableness in the FEC’s actions will likely result in a holding that the FEC
did not err in its decision making. 153 The ruling here sets a continued precedent of
the judicial system’s deference to federal agencies in regard to matters within
their control.
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Mendez v. Barr, 960 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2020)
Synopsis
Tomas Mendez was charged by the Department of Homeland Security
with being inadmissible due to his conviction of misprision of felony. Following
a sustainment of the charge by both an Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of
Immigrant Appeals (BIA), Mendez petitioned the court for review. The court
found that a conviction of misprision did not render an alien inadmissible because
a misprision conviction is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.
Facts and Analysis
In 2004, Tomas Mendez was admitted to the United States as a permanent
resident.154 Six years later, he was convicted of misprision of a felony under 18
U.S.C. § 4, which criminalizes the act of concealing “knowledge of the
commission of a federal felony” and failure to “report it to the appropriate
authorities.”155 Upon Mendez’s return from a trip overseas in 2016, the
Department of Homeland Security found him inadmissible because he was a
“noncitizen convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).” 156 “The
immigration judge sustained the charge, and the Board of Immigration . . .
affirmed,” concluding “that the violation of Section 4 meant that [Mendez] had
committed a CIMT.”157
A CIMT is a “crime that is ‘inherently base, vile, or depraved, and
contrary to the accepted rules of morality and duties owed between persons or to
society in general.’”158 Although misprision was not always considered a CIMT,
the Eleventh Circuit found that “a conviction under Section 4 is categorically a
CIMT ‘because it necessarily involves an affirmative act of concealment or
participation in a felony, behavior that runs contrary to accepted societal duties
and involves dishonest or fraudulent activity.’”159 However, this view is not
unchallenged throughout the courts.160
Mendez brought a motion to terminate removal proceedings and for
cancellation of removal, on the grounds that misprision is not categorically a
CIMT. The IJ found Mendez removable, and following this, the BIA issued a
decision, declining to follow the Ninth Circuit’s holding that misprision is not
categorically a CIMT. Mendez petitioned the court for review, arguing that “a
conviction for misprision is not a CIMT because it does not categorically involve
conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved” and that the BIA’s decision in
this case is not entitled to Chevron deference.161
The court began by addressing Mendez’s first argument. The BIA and the
courts use a “‘categorical approach’ focusing on the intrinsic nature of the
154
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offense” to determine whether a conviction qualifies as a CIMT.162 The
conviction elements under Section 4 consist of “(1) the principal committed and
completed the alleged felony, (2) the defendant had full knowledge of that fact,
(3) the defendant failed to notify the authorities, and (4) the defendant took steps
to conceal the crime.”163 The court found that the categorical approach failed in
this case, as a critical component of a CIMT is an evil intent, but nothing in
Section 4 references intent whatsoever. 164 The court provided several examples to
further emphasize its point that the crime of misprision can occur without any evil
intent in the mind of the defendant. 165 Furthermore, the BIA itself has previously
held that misprision does not contain an intent element that would qualify it as a
CIMT.166
The government attempted to combat these findings by relying on
precedent “that a crime in which fraud is an ingredient involves moral
turpitude.”167 The court disagreed, however, finding that Congress would have
chosen to include an intent requirement had it felt it appropriate and if an intent
requirement was “implied” into Section 4, it would be extremely difficult to
determine whether any crime was a CIMT.168
The dissent concluded that misprision should qualify as a CIMT because it
involves “dishonest and deceitful behavior.” 169 The majority dismissed the
dissent’s argument by noting that should it be accepted, it would “eviscerate the
distinction in the law between generic criminal conduct and crimes involving
moral turpitude, thus turning almost all crimes into CIMTs.”170 Furthermore, the
court notes that it is unlikely that Congress intended that any individual who fails
to inform proper authorities of a crime has “committed a crime that is inherently
vile and immoral.”171 According to its own precedent, the BIA has held that more
than deceit or intent to conceal is needed to qualify a crime as a CIMT. 172
The government also argued that Chevron deference should be given to
the BIA’s decision that Section 4 be classified as a CIMT.173 The court disagreed,
finding that although Chevron deference applies to the BIA’s published
interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act, it does not apply to its
“interpretation of a criminal statute.”174
162
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Holding
The court found that because crimes under Section 4 do not have an evil
intent requirement among their elements, they cannot be categorically classified
as CIMTs.175 The BIA’s argument that an intent requirement could be “implied”
into Section 4 was also rejected, as it would make the test too difficult to
practically apply.176 Finally, the court did not give Chevron deference to the
BIA’s interpretation of Section 4, as it was only an interpretation of a criminal
statute rather than an interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” 177
Impact
In this decision, the Second Circuit joined with the Ninth Circuit in
holding that misprision cannot be categorically classified as a CIMT. 178 This
decision could have repercussions for the immigration system and potentially
loosen the definition of a CIMT. If a crime does not explicitly contain an intent
requirement in its elements, it likely cannot be considered a CIMT for the
purposes of charges by the Department of Homeland Security. Additionally, the
court clarified that Chevron deference should only be given to the BIA’s
interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act, rather than any
interpretation made by the agency.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v.
DeVos, 2020 WL 5291406 1 (D.D.C. 2020)
Synopsis
The plaintiff advocacy groups, public school districts, and parents of
children enrolled in public school, brought an action against the defendant
Department of Education (Department) to challenge its implementation of the
provision of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES
Act) regarding funding to aid schools. They specifically challenged the
Department’s finding that the legislation prohibited differentiation between
private and public schools when considering aid distribution. The district court
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the Department was
meant to provide equitable services using the framework set forth in the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) and that the
Department exceeded its authority in using an interim final rule in interpreting the
provision of the CARES Act.
Facts and Analysis
Congress passed the CARES Act in response to the COVID-19 crisis,
which in part allocated billions of dollars to schools to assist them through the
challenges of the global pandemic. 179 Of the three sub-funds, two were relevant
to this litigation: the Governors’ Emergency Relief Fund (GEER), which provided
governors “with discretion to distribute funding to the Local Education Agencies
(LEAs) that need it the most,” and the Elementary and Secondary School
Emergency Relief Fund (ESSER), which directed the Department of Education to
distribute funds to each state, which would then in turn distribute to LEAs, which
would pass on the funding to schools according to a formula.180 While the GEER
fund allowed room for discretion in distribution of funds, the ESSER did not – it
mandated that funds “shall be allocated by the Secretary to each state in the same
proportion as each State received under part A of title I of the [ESEA] of 1965 in
the most recent fiscal year.”181 Additionally, the CARES Act dictated how
private schools could qualify for GEER and ESSER funding by referencing the
method established in the ESEA, which stated that expenditures to private schools
should be equal to “the proportion of funds allocated to participating school
attendance areas based on the number of children from low-income families who
attend private schools.”182
In April of 2020, the Department of Education “advised that GEER and
ESSER funds should be used to ‘serve all non-public school students and teachers
179
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. DeVos, 2020 WL
5291406, at *1 (D.D.C. 2020).
180
Id. at 1.
181
Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020)).
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without regard to family income, residency, or eligibility based on low
achievement.’”183 It issued an interim final rule expressing the same position in
July 2020, finding that the “text of the CARES Act was ambiguous and its
interpretation was reasonable in light of the text, structure, and purpose of the
CARES Act.”184 In its interim order, the Department stated that LEAs have two
choices: to “disburse funds equally between all public schools and all private
schools or disburse funds based on low-income student population for both public
and private schools.”185 Regardless of the method employed by LEAs, the
Department interpreted the CARES Act to prohibit “differentiation between
public and private schools.”186 As the CARES Act did not vest rulemaking
authority on the Department, the Department instead utilized its general
rulemaking powers in “administer[ing] programs under its purview.” 187
Furthermore, the typical notice and comment rulemaking was foregone by the
Department, who instead cited the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) exception
for good cause, noting the current global pandemic. 188
The plaintiffs brought suit in July of 2020 and moved for a preliminary
injunction or summary judgment in August 2020. 189 They contended that “the
Department did not have the authority to issue the interim final rule” and that “the
interim final rule the Department did issue was contrary to the CARES Act.” 190
To assess the plaintiffs’ claims, the court utilized the Chevron analysis – it
first determined whether the statute was ambiguous as written and if not, the
inquiry ends.191 However, if the statute is ambiguous, the court determines
whether the interpretation of the agency at question is reasonable, and if so, it is
entitled to proper deference.192
When applying that analysis to the statute at issue here, the court found
that “[i]n describing the funding mechanism for the GEER and ESSER sub-funds,
Congress spoke with clarity and precision” by “us[ing] mandatory language,
cross-referenc[ing] a statutory provision by section number, and [leaving] no term
up to interpretation.”193 By using ordinary language in the statute, Congress’s
intent was to ensure that LEAs distributed funds in the same manner as in the
cross-referenced statute (Section 1117 of the ESEA), using the same methodology
and procedures (in this case, a formula “that accounts for the number of children
from low-income families”).194 Furthermore, the court noted that if Congress had
meant to provide equal funding to private and public schools without distinction
183
Id. at 2 (citing Providing Equitable Services to Students and Teachers in Non-Public
Schools Under the CARES Act Programs, https://oese.ed.gov/files/2020/06/Providing-EquitableServices-under-the-CARES-Act-Programs-Update-6-25-2020.pdf (Apr. 30, 2020) at 3).
184
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by income, it could have instead cited Section 8501 of the ESEA, which allows
for that very formula.195 Congress’s choice of Section 1117 makes its intent in
the manner of fund distribution clear. 196
The Department put forth several arguments in defense of its interpretation
of the statute. It first attempted to argue that the term “equitable services” was
ambiguous and in light of that, its interpretation was reasonable. 197 While the
court noted that this notion may have been true in isolation, it also found that
Congress’s cross referencing of Section 1117 of the ESEA should have directed
the Department’s attention to the specific formula found there. 198 The
Department also argued that Section 18005(a) was facially ambiguous, but the
court states that “simply because Congress could have been clearer, that alone
does not render an unambiguous text ambiguous.”199 The Department also relied
on the supposed disparity between the CARES Act (to deliver emergency relief to
all schools) and Title I-A (to allow aid to low-achieving students). 200 The court
noted that purposive arguments such as this cannot overcome the text of the
statute and that the text of the CARES Act itself “calls for ‘[a]ctivities to address
the unique needs of low-income children or students.’”201
The Department’s final argument, based on the statute’s structure, claimed
that provisions of Section 1117 of the ESEA would render other sections of the
CARES Act superfluous, such as sections about public schools consulting with
private schools about equitable services and public schools retaining control over
funds.202 The court counters with precedent that redundancy does not affect the
plain meaning of the statute as written – “that it incorporates that formula
described in Section 1117 for distributing equitable services by the number of
children from low-income families.”203
The plaintiffs’ final argument “contend[ed] that the Department exceeded
its delegated authority by promulgating the interim final rule.” 204 Upon
examining this argument, the court found that neither general rulemaking
authority provision set out in precedent accounted for the Department’s action
here.205 The text of the CARES Act directs the Secretary to allocate funds from
the sub-funds in the same manner cross-referenced in the ESEA statute, as
contrasted with other portions of the CARES Act that provide the Secretary with
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discretion in the allocation of funds.206 Because of this disparity, Congress’s
decision to withhold authority from the Secretary regarding this section was
intentional.207 The court ultimately concluded that “[b]ecause the Act is not
ambiguous and did not otherwise delegate rulemaking authority, the Department
acted beyond its authority in promulgating the interim final rule.” 208
Holding
The court granted the plaintiffs’ expedited motion for summary
judgment.209 Under the APA, courts are to “‘hold unlawful and set aside agency
action’ that is in excess of statutory authority or ‘not in accordance with law.’” 210
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the interim final rule created by the
Department was “contrary to the unambiguous mandate of the Act” and that the
Act did not provide the Department with rulemaking authority nor ambiguity for
the agency to address.211 Congress’s intent in the CARES Act was not ambiguous
as it specifically cross-referenced a section of the ESEA that allowed for a
specific formula of distributing funds.212 Additionally, the Department acted
outside of its granted authority in the CARES Act by issuing the final interim rule
in regard to this section.213 The court therefore set aside the interim rule.214
Impact
The court expresses deference to the clear language of Congress in this
case, noting that a department has overstepped its bounds in attempting to
interpret an unambiguous statute in a contrary way. It notes substantial precedent
for the notion that a regulation crafted by a department that is contrary to an
existing statute should be regarded as null and void. 215 Furthermore, the court
notes that “[a] lthough some might agree with the Department's position as a
matter of policy, “‘[a]n agency has no power to ‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic
policy goals by rewriting unambiguous statutory terms.’”216 This is undoubtedly
a warning to government agencies to be mindful of their boundaries when
interpreting policy.
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United States v. Cardena, 461 F.Supp.3d 798 (N.D. Ill. 2020)
Synopsis
The defendant, a convict serving time in prison for drug-trafficking-related
offenses, filed a motion for compassionate release due to the COVID-19
pandemic. The government alleged that the defendant had not properly exhausted
proper administrative remedies. After considering the case, the district court held
that the government failed to bear its burden of proof and that even if it had, the
exhaustion requirement should be waived. The court found that the extraordinary
circumstances surrounding the coronavirus pandemic merited compassionate
release and that compassionate release was consistent with relevant statutory
sentencing factors.
Facts and Analysis
Robert Cardena, a 41-year-old man, moved for compassionate release
under 18. U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a statute which permits sentence
modification under “extraordinary and compelling circumstances.” 217 His
original charge related to a racketeering conspiracy and possession of cocaine
with the intent to sell, but the court at his sentencing found that Cardena was a
minor participant in the offenses and that his involvement was limited. 218 To
date, he served more than nine years of his ten year sentence and had one minor
disciplinary issue while in prison.219
Cardena, had been diagnosed with hypertension and Type II diabetes. 220
Both of these conditions are considered risk factors for COVID-19.221 Cardena
moved for compassionate release based on the fact that the pandemic itself, in
addition to his “current placement in a residential reentry center (RRC) where he
is in close contact with other inmates circulating in the wider community and very
close to the end of his sentence” amounted to “extraordinary and compelling
circumstances that the court did not and could not have foreseen at sentencing.” 222
Following an emergency letter motion written by Cardena without the assistance
of a lawyer asking for compassionate release or home confinement under the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), the court
appointed a lawyer and set a deadline for the government’s response. 223
In its response, the government asserted that the motion for compassionate
release was moot because the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had transferred
Cardena from the federal prison in Milan, Michigan to a halfway house in
Wisconsin and that Cardena did not properly exhaust administrative remedies
before filing for compassionate release. 224 The court previously rejected the
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government’s mootness argument and Cardena no longer sought home
confinement, only that he be granted compassionate release. 225
The court first considers the government’s claim that Cardena did not
exhaust administrative remedies as required by the First Step Act of 2018. 226 The
Act states that “the defendant may also bring a motion for compassionate release
‘after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure
of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse
of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's
facility.’”227 The government asserted that Cardena did not submit a request for
compassionate release at the time the case was brought, although he had since
filed an administrative request for compassionate release.228 However, the
government conceded that the Seventh Circuit would likely follow the rule in
United States v. Taylor, which held that “§ 3582(c)(1)(A)’s statutory exhaustion
requirement is not jurisdictional but is rather a claims-processing rule.”229
Ultimately, the court found that the statutory exhaustion requirement in Section
3582(c)(1)(A) (as well as the relevant 30-day waiting period) could be waived in
certain circumstances.230
However, the court noted that it still must examine whether the
government met its burden of proof in regard to exhaustion.231 The government
did not inform the court about the result of Cardena’s impending request for
compassionate release and the court notes that it is unlikely that the BOP has
come to a final decision regarding it. 232 The court “cannot assume that facts exist
which the government has the burden to prove.”233 However, even if the
government had met its burden, the court found that the exhaustion requirement
would be waived in this case. 234 “Courts have found that the text of §
3582(c)(1)(A) and the legislative history of the First Step Act demonstrate that in
limited circumstances the 30-day waiting period can be waived if it “‘could not
serve the congressional objective of ensuring prisoners receive a meaningful and
prompt opportunity for a judicial determination on the motion.’”235 When
considering the coronavirus pandemic and its risks, the court held that the
“purpose of the statute is served by waiving the 30-day waiting period.”236
The court then moved to the merits of Cardena’s motion for
compassionate release. 237 It noted the catch-all provision in the current legislation
and stated that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (the list of extraordinary and compelling
circumstances to be examined on a motion for compassionate release) serves as
225

Id. at 801.
Id.
227
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)).
228
Id.
229
Id. See United States v. Taylor, 778 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2015).
230
Cardena at 802.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id. (citing United States v. Witter, 2020 WL 1974200 1, 6 (W.D. Wis. 2020)).
236
Id.
237
Id.
226

SPRING 2021

LEGAL SUMMARIES

137

guidance rather than binding rules. 238 The court decided that the defendant’s
medical condition, age, and family circumstances are no longer the only factors to
consider, and when considering the present case, Cardena’s diagnosed medical
conditions, the threat of exposure to COVID-19, and the fact that his sentence was
drawing to a close constituted extraordinary and compelling circumstances.239 In
the prison where Cardena was housed when he filed his motion, there were over
forty confirmed cases of COVID-19 and the government’s contention that the
halfway house where Cardena currently resides has no confirmed cases bore little
weight, as the BOP tested only those who exhibited symptoms. 240 The court
noted that many infected individuals do not show symptoms and the “crowded
conditions in halfway houses make an outbreak from even a small number of
cases more likely than in the general population because staff and residents often
circulate through the facility.”241 With the facts before it, the court concluded that
extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting a compassionate release
were present here.242
However, the court then conducted its analysis of the factors it considered
when it originally sentenced Cardena. 243 When considering the need to protect
the public, the court noted that Cardena “has little in the way of a criminal
record”244 and that “the BOP's early transfer of Cardena to a RRC further suggests
strongly that it concurs that Cardena has reached the point at which facilitating his
transition to the community is warranted.”245 Cardena took courses in prison to
assist in his transition and had a solid reentry plan that the court found sufficiently
stable as to warrant depriving him of the services and support of a halfway
house.246
Holding
The court ultimately granted Cardena’s motion for compassionate
release.247 Cardena’s requirement to exhaust all administrative remedies before
making his request would have been waived by the court had the government met
its burden of proof on the issue.248 Furthermore, the extenuating circumstances of
the COVID-19 pandemic constituted extraordinary and compelling circumstances
allowing for a compassionate release. 249 Finally, when looking at Cardena’s
situation specifically, the court concluded that due to his lack of a substantial
criminal record and his stable reentry plan, compassionate release should be
granted.250
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Impact
This case has a short-term impact on those prisoners seeking release due to
the COVID-19 pandemic. With prisons being a high-risk area, those with preexisting conditions now have a district court precedent upon which to rest a
motion for compassionate release. It also has a long-term impact in terms of
compassionate release requests in the future. Courts are increasingly less bound
to the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 factors as anything more than guidelines, so prisoners
with other extenuating factors have a chance for compassionate release.
Furthermore, the court here noted that in limited circumstances, the 30-day
waiting period and the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies can be
waived. This case will prove instructive for inmates filing for compassionate
release both during the coronavirus pandemic and in the future.

